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Abstract—This paper proposes Yggdrasil, a protocol for
privacy-aware dual data deduplication in multi client settings.
Yggdrasil is designed to reduce the cloud storage space while
safeguarding the privacy of the client’s outsourced data. Yggdrasil
combines three innovative tools to achieve this goal. First,
generalized deduplication, an emerging technique to reduce data
footprint. Second, non-deterministic transformations that are
described compactly and improve the degree of data compression
in the Cloud (across users). Third, data preprocessing in the
clients in the form of lightweight, privacy-driven transformations
prior to upload. This guarantees that an honest-but-curious
Cloud service trying to retrieve the client’s actual data will face
a high degree of uncertainty as to what the original data is. We
provide a mathematical analysis of the measure of uncertainty
as well as the compression potential of our protocol. Our
experiments with a HDFS log data set shows that 49 % overall
compression can be achieved, with clients storing only 12 % for
privacy and the Cloud storing the rest. This is achieved while
ensuring that each fragment uploaded to the Cloud would have
10
293 possible original strings from the client. Higher uncertainty
is possible, with some reduction of compression potential.
Index Terms—Compression, privacy, deduplication
I. INTRODUCTION
The massive migration of data from storage facilities on
‘the Premise’ to ‘the Cloud’ has led to a boom in the offer of
Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs). Nowadays, people can turn
to a vast spectrum of CSPs that offer a virtually unlimited
storage accessible from ‘anywhere’ in the world. To deliver
the promised features to multiple clients at a competitive
price, CSPs resort to compression techniques that reduce the
footprint of data, so as to fit more in less space. A popular
approach to reach this goal is to adopt data deduplication
techniques. In brief, these solutions work by recognizing
whether a freshly uploaded file is the same as one already
stored on the server. If so, there is no need to store the new file:
a pointer to the already existing copy would suffice. Obviously
the chance that clients upload the exact same data is quite
low, but applying this technique on chunks of files leads to
a non trivial compression capability. This relevant when a
client stores different versions of the same file (thus, files have
several common chunks), or different clients use the same kind
of files, e.g., virtual machine disk images of different Linux
distributions [1], [2]
Vestergaard et al. recently proposed generalized deduplica-
tion (GD) [3], [4], a technique to further reduce the footprint
of the storage systems. The intuition behind GD is to perform
data compression on chunks that are nearly identical rather
than exactly the same. This is possible by using a trans-
formation function that maps each chunk to a basis and a
deviation, where different chunks may have the same basis
but different and unique deviations to differentiate them. The
system assigns a fingerprint, e.g., a hash function to each
basis and carries out deduplication on the bases. Using GD,
similar chunks, i.e., chunks that are mapped to the same basis
are deduplicated together. The system then stores a pointer
to the basis and the deviation in form of a small textual
deviation with the information on how the new chunk differs
from the pointed basis. It has been shown that generalized
deduplication achieves a higher level of compression than
classic deduplication techniques [4].
Trivially, deduplication techniques perform better on highly
correlated data. However, similarities appear only if the files
are uploaded in plaintext1, which is not desirable in many
applications. Privacy-conscious clients may upload encrypted
data to the Cloud. The semantic security of the encryption
implies that ciphertexts look random. In particular, files that
could be deduplicated become uncorrelated when encrypted,
undermining the whole purpose of deduplication.
Up to now, the bulk of work performs deduplication for
storage on plaintext data at one location, usually on the Cloud
side, since it is assumed to have more computational power
a client. In contrast, we consider the following unorthodox
setting: secure deduplication is carried out, in a subsequent
manner, by two parties. That is, the client (e.g., user end
device, local storage system, private Cloud) and the server
(e.g., CSP). We call this method dual deduplication. We
present a solution that allows clients to outsource their data in
a privacy-preserving manner, while the server is guaranteed a
high compression rate.
We achieve this solution by letting the clients preprocess
their data prior to upload. The outcome of this process is
a pair where the first item is an outsourced generalized
deduplication friendly ‘basis’ that the client sends to the cloud.
In practice, this could be achieved by the client uploading a
single file containing a number of unique bases of the same
size or by uploading each basis separately. The second item
is a deviation, a short string that simultaneously serves two
1Alternatively, the files could be encrytped using a deterministic encryption
scheme, and then uploaded. However deterministic encryption cannot be
semantically secure. Moreover to guarantee meaningful deduplication of
ciphertexts generated by different clients there needs to be some coordination
on the encryption key.
purposes: (1) enabling the correct recovery of the original data
from the outsourced file (e.g., indicating which basis was used
and how was it modified to generate the i-th data chunk); and
(2) providing some level of privacy on the outsourced data.
Having received a set of deduplication-friendly bases, the
CSP can use GD to successfully deduplicate bases received
from numerous clients, reducing the total storage space to a
fraction of what could be achieved from raw, unprocessed data.
Although the overall storage space needed by the server and
the clients may be higher than if deduplication was carried out
only on the server side, the storage space required by each
party, i.e., client and server separately, is considerably smaller
compared to plain storage on the client side or generalized
deduplication on unprocessed data on the server side.
We name our solution Yggdrasil, as the Cosmic Tree of Life
in the Norse mythology. Yggdrasil is an enormous ash tree that
connects the different worlds with the heavens. We use this as
a metaphor for our system (see Fig. 1). The clients preprocess
the data and keep a fraction of it for privacy reasons. The
Cloud collects the deduplication-friently bases output by the
clients and organizes them into a (compressed) foliage.
The contributions of this paper are organized as follows.
Section II introduces the framework of Yggdrasil; the kind
of adversary we deal with (an honest-but-curious CSP) and
its goal (to reconstruct clients’ original data); and the math-
ematical expressions we use to measure the performance of
the system including compression ratios, and the uncertainty
metric measuring the privacy retained by clients against our
adversary. Section III explains our solution, Yggdrasil, in de-
tail (its algorithms and how they interact). Section IV presents
our upper bounds on the different compression ratios and pri-
vacy analysis of our solution. Section V collects and discusses
the numerical results obtained when testing Yggdrasil on a real
dataset of HDFS log files. Our main focus is the compression
potential of our proposal in different settings depending on
the way we parse raw data and the type of transformations
allowed on the clients’ side. Section VI concludes the paper
and highlights directions for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
In this section, we define our system model, the attacker
model and then present the metrics we use to analyze the
performance and privacy of our proposal Yggdrasil.
A. System Model
Figure 1 depicts our system model. Clients’ desiderata is to
retain some level of privacy on their files while minimizing the
amount of local storage. The CSP desiderata is to optimize its
storage space. In order to meet all desiderata simultaneously,
we let clients apply some transformations on their data, prior
to upload. Such transformations aim to prevent the CSP (or
any third party) from easily guessing the clients’ original (raw)
data while requiring required minimal storage on the clients’
side. To minimize the storage requirements on the Cloud side,
we let the CSP perform Generalized Deduplication. To further
Cloud
Client1
Client2
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Fig. 1. Yggdrasil system model: several independent clients upload data to
the same cloud storage provider.
decrease storage, our model envisions a CSP that processes
outsourced data before running GD.
We consider that the system operates on data strings with
k-bit symbols, i.e., any symbol can take N = 2k possible
values. A file is broken up into a number of original strings of
size no symbols, i.e., F ∈ ({0, 1}k)no . After a client applies
its transformation, the resulting base (called F ′) of size nb
symbols and there is an associated local deviation D that
captures the changes performed on the original string. At a
given point, there are f strings in the Client and b bases stored
in the Cloud.
An instructive example of Client side transformations is the
(randomized) 1-deletion depicted in Figure 2. This transfor-
mation takes in input a string F of n elements, selects a
component of F at random, say the i-th, and outputs the base
F ′ of n−1 elements obtained from F by removing (deleting)
the i-th element, and the 2-element deviation D consisting of
the deleted value and its original position i (in F ).
To build up intuition, the more deletions a client per-
forms before uploading its data the harder it is for a CSP
to reconstruct the original data. This increases the privacy
of the outsourced data, however, the storage footprint on
the client’s side also increases. Section III-A elaborates on
the transformations deployed in Yggdrasil, while Section IV
analyzes the trade off between level of uncertainty and storage
size on the client end.
B. Attacker Model
We consider privacy against a computationally unbounded,
honest-but-curious CSP, In detail, we assume this CSP knows
the distribution of clients’ raw files D, reads all data out-
sourced by clients, and has unlimited computational power.
The attacker’s goal is to correctly reconstruct the clients’ origi-
nal files. We discuss how to measure the success probability of
such attacks in the next section (II-C) through the ‘uncertainty
metric’. Investigating how to reach security against a malicious
attacker, either CSP or client is left as future work.
C. Performance Metrics
In what follows, DB denotes a database (collection of
arbitrary files F ), S denotes the dual deduplication system
described in Section II-A, size is a function that takes as input
a system S, a party, e.g., Client or Cloud and a database DB,
and returns the size of the storage space required by the given
party to store DB according to the system S.
4 6 1 3 0 7 1 2 2 5 4 5 4 6 1 3 0 7 2 2 5 4 5 1 6
Original/Raw Data (F ) Base to Outsource (F ′) Deviation (D)
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Fig. 2. Example of a 1-deletion: the random index is i = 6 and the corresponding deleted value is 1 (highlighted in red).
Since our model describes systems where both Client and
Cloud store some piece of information, it is natural to define
three quantities to measure the system compression capability.
Client Compression Ratio:
CClient =
size(S,Client, DB)
|DB|
. (1)
Cloud Compression Ratio:
CCloud =
size(S,Cloud, DB)
|DB|
. (2)
Global Compression Ratio:
C =
size(S,Client, DB) + size(S,Cloud, DB)
|DB|
. (3)
Concretely, C measures the compression capability of our
system. The lower the value of C the better the compression
level and the smaller the overall storage space required. An
ideal solution would have C < 1.
Now we define a metric for evaluating the privacy of a
system S. The uncertainty metric U measures the degree of
uncertainty a honest-but-curious CSP faces when trying to
retrieve clients’ original files from the data they outsource.
To formally define U we need a distribution D defined on the
database DB. This essentially simulates the fact that CSP may
know what are the most common files. Thus we define
Uncertainty Metric:
U(F ) = ProbF←D[F
∗ ← A(D, F ′)|F ∗ = F ] (4)
where F ′ is the outsourced data uploaded by the clients to the
Cloud in correspondence to the original F .
III. Yggdrasil
We begin by describing the set of allowed transformations
in Yggdrasil. Then we explain the protocol in detail.
A. Allowed Transformations in Yggdrasil
From information theory, we know four functions to trans-
form a string. Namely, (i) insert an element to a posi-
tion, (ii) delete an element from a position, (iii) swap two
elements, and (iv) change the value of a given position. Note
that swap and change value do not change the length of the
string, while insert and delete do.
Yggdrasil allows Client and Cloud to determine policies
on how to transform the data to obtain deduplication friendly
strings. The aim is to minimize the number of operations to
perform while achieving efficient deduplication rate on the
Cloud and some level of privacy at the Client side. These
policies typically require a metric to determine similarities
among strings. A natural metric is the Hamming distance,
indicating the number of positions with different values in
two strings of the same length. This essentially tells us
how many change value operations we need to transform
a string into another. Swap Distance indicates the number
of operations to change a string into another using only the
swap and change value. DamerauLevenshtein Distance is
the most complete metric, essentially indicating the number
of operations to transform one string into another if we use
all 4 transformations (i)-(iv) [5].
Previous work on GD focused primarily on changing values
operations using Hamming or Reed-Solomon codes [4], [6].
Here we instead consider the three operations (ii)-(iii)-(iv):
delete (Del), swap (Swap) and change value (ChngV). We
discard the insert function as it increases the size of a string,
which is counterproductive for compressing the data.
In Yggdrasil, Client applies Del transformations on DB
prior to sending data to Cloud to achieve the desired level
of privacy.2 Cloud applies Swap and ChngV to reduce the
distance between the strings uploaded by Client, generating
strings that are suitable for genealized deduplication.
B. Proposed Protocol
We describe Yggdrasil, our protocol for privacy-aware dual
deduplication in multi client settings. The protocol is run be-
tween Client and Cloud, components of S and is parametrized
by (a) a distance metric dist; (b) a threshold value τ > 0 that
indicates the maximum number of operations allowed in the
Cloud per string; At initialization Cloud holds an initial set
nb-size strings called bases S = {base1, . . . , baseb}.
3 S can
be updated over time, but the full potential of updating S will
be studied in future work.
At its core, the protocol performs a number of operations in
the Client with a focus on privacy protection prior to uploading
to the Cloud. Cloud uses the information from each Client
and the S to attempt deduplication of similar bases that are τ
operations away given a dist metric. If the data is similar to
one basis in the S, it will be deduplicated, otherwise, it will
be stored as it is. In the following, we provide a description of
the various operations of Yggdrasil and where they take place.
SetUp(S): This algorithm is run by the Cloud periodically.
It takes as input a set of bases S and outputs a policy
Policy that concisely describes S.4
Upload(Policy, F ): This algorithm is run by Client using a
given Policy On input of a file F , Del are applied to F
2Note that Del drops random components from the original string (Fig. 2)
and thus acts as a deletion channel [7] for the Cloud. The hardness of the
reconstruction of the original data reflects into the Client’s privacy level.
3We do not specify how to construct the initial set S . However, the Comp
algorithm of Yggdrasil essentially allows to start from an empty S = ∅ and
populate it according to the uploaded files.
4Policies ensure efficient deduplication according to the current set of bases.
To give an example Policy could encode ‘binary strings of length nb with 5
number of 0s towards the end’.
1. SetUp S 3. Comp
Deco
Get 2. UploadPolicy
Fig. 3. Yggdrasil System Model for Secure, Multi-client Dual Deduplication
according to Policy until it results in a string F ′ with
the size of nb, and its corresponding deviation D. Then,
it generates a unique file identifier fid for the pair (F ′,
D). It outputs the pair (fid,F ′) to the CSP, while the pair
(fid,D) are stored locally on the Client.
Comp(S, fid, F ′): This algorithm is run by the Cloud. It takes
as input S, a file identifier fid and a string F ′. Then, it
performs the following steps:
1. If F ′ = base ∈ S set dev = ∅ and go to step 4.
2. If ∃base ∈ S that 0 < dist(F ′,S) ≤ τ then:
- Repeatedly apply Swap and ChngV on F ′ until
reaching the target base. Denote by dev the corresponding
string of deviations.
3. If ∀base ∈ S that dist(F ′,S) > τ set base := F ′, set
dev = ∅ and add base to S.
4. Perform deduplication by storing the file identifier fid,
a pointer to base and the string dev.
Get(fid, D, ·): This algorithm is initiated by Client sending
an fid, symbolizing a request to retrieve the item that
was outsourced with that fid. Upon receiving a response
F ′ from Cloud, the Client uses the information encoded
in the local deviation D connected to fid to invert the
deletions that led to F ′, thus reconstructing F .
Deco(DB, ·): This algorithm is run on Cloud upon receiving a
query of the form fid. Cloud checks whether it has stored
fid. If not, it ignores the query, otherwise it retrieve the
corresponding item (fid, base,dev) and inverts the general-
ized deduplication performed by Comp to reconstruct the
decompressed F ′ corresponding to the outsourced string.
F ′ is sent back to Client.
IV. ANALYSIS OF YGGDRASIL
In the following, we analyze the compression rate and
the privacy (uncertainty measure) achieved by Yggdrasil. In
this section, unless stated otherwise, we use log(x) as the
logarithm in base 2 of x.
A. Client Compression Ratio
We begin our analysis with studying the compression ratio
on the client side, i.e., CClient. To compute CClient for one string
F , we need to accurately measure the size of D. Assuming
Client performed x = no − nb subsequent Del on F , then
D contains the x deleted values (each value has k bits) and
a pointer to their original locations in F (each pointer has
⌈log(no)⌉). Therefore, the required storage needed in Client
is equal to:
size(S,Client, F ) = x(⌈log(no)⌉+ k) + sfid,
where sfid is the size in bits of a file identifier (sfid = size(fid)).
If our DB has f files, the required storage on the Client side
for the whole DB is
size(S,Client, DB) = f(x(⌈log(no)⌉+ k) + sfid).
If DB contains f strings, the total storage size required for
DB prior to the transformations of Yggdrasil is
|DB| = f · k · no.
Thus,
CClient =
x(⌈log(no)⌉+ k) + sfid
k · no
. (5)
Clearly CClient < 1 if and only if
sfid + x · (⌈log(no)⌉+ k) < k · no.
B. Cloud Compression Ratio
The data stored in Cloud The size of data stored in the Cloud
consists of b basis, where each basis has nb symbols of size
k; one file identifier fid per string F and the dev generated in
Comp procedure for deduplicated strings. Each Swap in Cloud
adds 2⌈log(no)⌉ and each ChngV adds k + ⌈log(no)⌉ to dev.
As there are f − b deduplicated strings and the number of
operations in Cloud for each F is bounded by τ , we have
size(S,Cloud, DB) ≤ b·k ·nb+f ·sfid+(f−b)·τ(2⌈log(no)⌉).
Therefore, for the compression ratio in Cloud, we have:
CCloud =
sfid + 2τ⌈log(no)⌉+ r(k · nb − 2τ⌈log(no)⌉)
k · no
.
where r is the fraction of number of bases to the number of
original strings, i.e., r = b
f
The condition for achieving a
compression ratio of less than one is:
r ≤ 1−
sfid − k · x
k · (no − x)− 2τ⌈log(no)⌉
⇔ CCloud ≤ 1.
C. Global Compression Ratio
The global compression ratio of the system is given by the
sum of the Client compression ratio and the Cloud one. Thus,
C =
2sfid + k · x+ (2τ + x)⌈log(no)⌉+ r(k · nb − 2τ⌈log(no)⌉)
k · no
. (6)
D. Uncertainty of Multiple 1-Deletions
We now calculate the uncertainty of a data item after
Client performs x 1-deletions. We consider the probability
distribution D over the set of k-bit symbols to be uniformly
random, i.e., every symbol has the same probability 1/2k to be
selected. In this setting, our definition of uncertainty (Eq. (4))
states that the uncertainty of a string U(F ′) is equal to 1 over
the number of original strings F˜ that can be generated by the
base F ′ output to the Cloud. Let m denote this value, then [8]:
TABLE I
NUMERICAL COMPUTATION OF m AND U FOR VARYING k, no AND nb .
k nb no m U
2 10 15 8.53 × 106 1.17× 10−7
4 10 15 2.35 × 109 4.26× 10−10
8 10 15 3.24× 1015 3.08× 10−16
2 100 150 1.72× 1064 5.81× 10−65
4 100 150 1.32× 1099 7.58× 10−100
8 100 150 4.28× 10160 2.34× 10−161
2 500 1000 1.47× 10538 6.80× 10−539
4 500 1000 3.21× 10887 3.12× 10−888
8 500 1000 5.05× 101502 1.98× 10−1503
m =
no−nb∑
j=0
(
no
j + nb
)
(2k − 1)no−nb−j . (7)
Intuitively, m counts the number of ‘preimagines of Upload’,
i.e., how many no-element strings F can generate the same
base F ′ for a combination of x Del. For large enough no and
nb ≥ nb, a good lower bound is to consider the first term in
the summation, i.e., m ≥
(
no
nb
)
(2k−1)no−nb . Using Eq. 7, the
uncertainty metric for a record F ← D is
U(F ) =
1
m
=
(2k − 1)nb−no∑no−nb
j=0
(
no
j+nb
)
(2k − 1)−j .
.
Table I shows this number for various symbol sizes k, original
string sizes no, and basis size nb. Even for small sequences
of no = 15 with k = 2, the uncertainty is in the order of
10−7. For more realistic cases, e.g., no = 1000, nb = 500
and k = 8, the uncertainty metric is 10−1503, creating a high
degree of potential uncertainty on Cloud.
E. Most Probable String
Let P (F = o|F ′,D) denote the probability of an original
string o of length no, given a basis F
′ and a probability
distribution of D for the symbols in the original strings.
From an attacker’s perspective, the key is to identify the most
probable string, i.e., the string o in the set of all strings of size
no, that has max
o
P (F = o|F ′,D). From a system designer’s
perspective, a similar question is interesting to achieve a higher
privacy in the system. Namely, the system wants to minimize
this probability.
In order to generate the original data, the attacker needs
to add no − nb symbols to the basis in arbitrary positions.
In this setup, The most probable strings is the string with
the most number of duplicates in the reconstruction. The
duplicates occur when we insert a value i between consecutive
elements in basis that already has value i. Suppose the longest
consecutive elements of value i in F ′ has length li, hence, the
number of possible duplicates is equal to:
max
i
no−nb∑
j=0
(li + j) = max
i
1
2
(no − nb + 1)(2 · li + no − nb).
Therefore, the most probable string has a probability of:
max
o
P (F = o|F ′,D) =
max
i
(1
2
pno−nbi · (no − nb + 1)(2 · li + no − nb)
)
,
(8)
Clearly, there is a strong dependence on the probability dis-
tribution of the original strings. To reduce this probability for
a set of data, we can define several policies:
Policy 1: Set the probability distribution of the elements
in the basis to be as close as possible to uniformly random
distribution, e.g., a ciphertext. This may be counterproductive
for the compression process. However, approaching a uniform
distribution provides clear privacy advantages. A system de-
signer can try to select the level of protection desired.
Policy 2: A basis does not include consecutive identical
symbols, especially the symbols with higher probability.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we first show our simulation results and then
discuss the results and the performance of Yggdrasil. In order
to validate our system, we use the data of 18 GB of HDFS
logs as our dataset. We developed a C++ implementation of
a Yggdrasil client applying random 1-deletions and a server
performing swap and change value operations. The client and
server both carry out deduplication steps separately. For the
sake of storage friendly implementation, we defined the fid of
bases to be a global variable auto-incremented by the Cloud.
This means that each fid has a storage size of log(Nb) where
Nb is the number of bases after deduplication. This can be
later changed to standard fingerprint functions, e.g., SHA-1,
SHA-256, in the Cloud. The impact of these slightly larger fid
is minor for bases of 1 KB of more in size, which is the case
we focus on in the following.
Fig. 4 shows that a judicious selection of the number of
transformations results in a total compression ratio C = 0.5527
for nb = 950 and C = 0.6583 for nb = 900. For a fixed
value of nb, the compression ratio in the Client is constant
as the client always performs no − nb deletions. However,
the compression ratio of the Cloud differs depending on
the maximum number of allowed swap and change value
operations (τ ). A small τ results in high compression rates.
In fact, overall stored data may be higher than the original
size because the number of bases that are deduplicated is low.
Thus, the extra storage required to store the operations is larger
than the gains from deduplication. A higher τ allows for more
bases to be deduplicated. We show that there exists a minimum
point for both Cloud and overall compression ratio. This is the
best compression ratio achievable for a given pair (k, nb) for
no = 1024. Our analysis shows that this minimum is close to
the median of the swap distance between all bases, which can
be used in future work as a heuristic for the optimal value of τ .
Larger τ values result in an increase in the compression ratio,
because there are diminishing returns on the deduplication
potential and the cost of recording additional operations results
in much higher storage costs.
TABLE II
THE BEST COMPRESSION RATE FOR OVERALL DATA, CLOUD AND CLIENT
FOR no = 1024 FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF k.
nb k τ C CClient CCloud
900 2 85 0.5527 0.2482 0.3158
900 4 44 0.5341 0.2119 0.3012
900 8 25 0.5419 0.1773 0.3645
900 16 16 0.8493 0.1468 0.7025
900 32 6 0.9329 0.1159 0.08168
950 2 115 0.6583 0.4423 0.2159
950 4 59 0.5927 0.4038 0.1889
950 8 31 0.4912 0.3645 0.1266
950 16 15 0.8922 0.3218 0.6705
950 32 7 1.0657 0.2894 0.7352
Fig. 4.(c) shows the best compression ratio achieved for
various values of nb and k and a fixed no and shows an
optimal selection of nb and k to achieve the highest overall
compression. Fig. 4.(c) shows that this minimum point is
reached for a lower nb when k is smaller, e.g., the best
compression ratio for k = 2 is achieved at nb = 900,
while the best compression ratio for k = 8 is achieved at
nb = 950. We also observe that k = 8 provides the best
potential for compression overall (49 % of original data) with
only small degradations of the compression rate around the
optimal point. This is important in practice as the Client’s
may aim to achieve different uncertainty - storage trade-offs
and k = 8 corresponds to byte representations that are good
to achieve efficient software implementations. Note that for
(k, nb, no) = (8, 950, 1024) the number of possible original
strings that could generate each basis uploaded to the Cloud is
around 10293. For k = 16, 32 the cost of storing the deviation
for each elimination in the Client is high, which limits the
overall potential for compression in the Client and, thus, in
the overall system. Table II provides details for the Cloud and
Client compression ratios for different k and nb.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented Yggdrasil, a protocol that allows Cloud Stor-
age Providers to carry out deduplication across data uploaded
by multiple clients, while introducing a level of uncertainty
which provides privacy for the data sent by the individual
clients. This injection of uncertainty is carried out by each
client individually by transforming the data prior to upload
and storing a compact description of such transformations
locally. We propose an improvement on the concept of gen-
eralized deduplication to increase its compression potential,
that consists of allowing the CSP to swap and change values
of the records it receives from clients. Our numerical results
show that Yggdrasil reduces the amount of data stored in the
Cloud, in the local device and even in the system as a whole,
while providing a high degree of uncertainty regarding the data
uploaded by each client. A side advantage of Yggdrasil is that
it can protect from side channel attacks from malicious clients
trying to gain knowledge about the data stored by other clients
in the Cloud. Future work will consider malicious adversaries
and clients that do not reveal the original size of the chunk
and only comply with the expected basis size of the Cloud.
This added uncertainty requires further analysis as the attacker
would not have the information about the chunk’s original size
as prior knowledge.
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Fig. 4. Global, Client and Server Compression Rates. The size of original records is fixed to size(F ) = no = 1024 bits.
